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RECENT DECISIONS

A SURVEY OF COMPUTER - RELATED
DECISIONS
Gary Rinkerman*
The following survey summarizes and categorizes computer-related opinions drawn from the Supreme Court Reporter, Federal Reporter 2d, Federal Supplement, and the
West system of regional reporters. The cases in the survey
contain legal principles or factual situations that involve computers or computer-related activities.
The case summaries have been given descriptive headings
and classified under various categories. It should be noted,
however, that the headings and categories should be used only
as a convenient index rather than as a limitation of a cases's
applicability. The following table lists the categories:
Antitrust

Government Affairs

Banking

Miscellaneous

Contract

Patent

Copyright

Tax

Criminal

Tort

Discovery

Trademark

Employment

Trade Secret

Evidence
o 1983 by Gary Rinkerman
* Mr. Rinkerman received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center. He
is the consulting editor for Computer Law Reporter and currently works as an inves-

tigative attorney in the Unfair Import Investigations Division of the International
Trade Commission. Any views expressed by Mr. Rinkerman are solely his own and do
not represent the views of any present or former employer.
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ANTITRUST
Antitrust Action Against Philips Fails; Court Allows
Narrow Reading of Dealer's Agreement Not to Sell
Competing Products- General Business Systems v. North
American Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1983).
General Business Systems (GBS), a former North American Philips (Philips) small business computer distributor,
charged Philips and affiliated companies with: (1) monopolization or attempted monopolization, in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act, of the market or the submarket for the
Philips-compatible magnetic ledger cards (mlcs) that served
as the stored memory devices for Philips' P300 and P350 series; (2) violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiracy to fix prices and allocate markets and refusal to deal; and
(3) violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act by tying computer
service and warranty protection to Philips' mlcs.
Based principally on GBS's incorporation of a separate
entity, Shasta, to market Xerox Corp.'s Diablo computers and
supplies, Philips conterclaimed, inter alia, that: (1) GBS and
other defendants conspired to eliminate Philips from the U.S.
computer market; (2) GBS breached its distributorship agreement by selling items that directly competed with Philips'
products; and (3) the defendants tortiously interfered with
Philips' relationships with customers.
GBS's Claims
In rejecting GBS's charge that Philips monopolized or attempted to monopolize a Philips-compatible mlcs market or
submarket, the court found that "the market for Philips-compatible mlcs was not insulated from the competitive struggle
between computer systems." The market for such mlcs was
not an independent market in which Philips could exercise
monopoly power. The court concurred with the lower court's
view that "Philips had little or no power to raise the price of
its mlcs without reducing its profits because any such increase
would reduce the sales of its computer system. . . ." The
court also found that "mlcs were sold separately from computers because of dynamics of use, not market
differentiation."
GBS contended that Philips' customers were "locked-in"
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to the purchase of Philips-compatible mlcs and that this gave
Philips power over a distinct mlcs market, particularly after
Philips ceased selling computers in the U.S. but continued to
sell the mlcs. The court found that there was no financial or
technical barrier preventing competitors from entering the
Philips-compatible mlcs market and that the "lock-in" theory
led to unacceptable results.
The court held that GBS did not present sufficient evidence to support price-fixing and market allocation charges
based on Philips' relationship with the only manufacturers of
Philips-compatible mlcs. Similarly, the court found that
Philips' exclusive purchase agreement with these two suppliers, who were disallowed from selling directly to Philips dealers, did not violate antitrust laws. The court also rejected
GBS's charge that Philips tied its mlcs to its service and warranty protection, which would be withheld if a Philips computer owner used another brand of mlcs. In the court's view,
GBS did not show that Philips had sufficient economic power
in the tying market to impose restrictions in the tied product
market.
Philips' Counterclaims
Based on GBS's incorporation of a separate entity,
Shasta, to sell Xerox Corp.'s Diablo computer systems, Philips
unsuccessfully alleged that GBS, Shasta and Xerox illegally
sought to drive Philips from the U.S. small business computer
market. The court found that Xerox put no pressure on GBS
to cease selling Philips computers and that GBS continued to
sell Philips products and actually attempted to persuade
Philips to update its obsolete product line.
As to the charge that GBS breached its agreement not to
market items that were "directly competitive" with Philips
equipment, the court found that the disk/CRT Diablo computers and the Philips mlcs computer did not directly compete because the former was such an advance over the latter.
"'Direct competition' within the meaning of the contract, appropriately should embrace only computers of approximately
the same technological generation."
Philips' tortious interference claims were similarly defeated: "inasmuch as [Shasta's] customers were offered a new
and better computer, no claim of tortious interference with
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Philips' customer relationships is made out."
IBM's Actions In Plug-Compatible Market Did Not
Incur Antitrust Liability- Transamerica Computer Co.
v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir. 1983).
Transamerica Computer Co. (Transamerica) unsuccessfully charged that International Business' Machines (IBM) violated section 2 of the Sherman Act when IBM responded to
competition, supplied in part by Transamerica, in the "plugcompatible" peripherals market. The allegedly impermissible
responses were: (1) institution of a discount fixed-term peripherals lease plan; (2) design changes in the CPU-peripherals
interfaces in various IBM machines so that non-IBM peripherals would no longer be compatible with IBM CPUs; and
(3) predatory pricing of "new" peripherals that were basically
repackaged versions of prior IBM peripheral models.
The court stated that its decision in this case was largely
controlled by two previous cases involving substantially the
same charges against IBM: California Computer Products,
Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979), and Memorex Corp.
v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). The court found that
the lease plans and several interface changes did not unreasonably restrain competition. While the court found that design changes in IBM's System 370 Models 115 and 125 did
unreasonably restrict competition, it also found that Transamerica suffered no damages attributable to these changes.
As to the predatory pricing claim, the court found that
IBM's prices were above average total cost, and that "Transamerica's evidence of predatory pricing falls far short of the
type of clear and convincing evidence that would permit a
trier of fact to find predatory pricing when prices are above
average total cost."
Single Suit Against Competing Former Employee
Can Constitute An Antitrust Violation- National Cash
Register Corp. v. Arnett, 554 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Colo. 1983).
NCR brought an action alleging, inter alia, breach of employment agreement and fiduciary duty as well as misappropriation of computer programs against Arnett, a former NCR
employee now competing with NCR in the market for computerized financial systems for use by banks. Arnett counterclaimed that NCR's institution of the suit was motivated only
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by an effort to force Arnett out of business, and was known by
NCR to be baseless and violative of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. NCR moved to dismiss the counterclaim with the argument that, under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, the institution of one suit rather than a "pattern" of suits cannot constitute an antitrust violation.
The court disagreed with NCR, stating:
In the instant case, NCR, a long established corporation,
has sued a fledgling company seeking to prevent its profiting from the only product it offers. A victory for NCR
would put the defendant out of business, thus eliminating
a competitor from the marketplace. Defendant claims
that the technical proof will show that NCR must have
realized that the programs or systems allegedly misappropriated were significantly different from NCR's. If the defendant can prove that assertion, then the conclusion
might be drawn that NCR acted with no intent other
than to "monopolize part of the trade or commerce
among the several states."

Apple's Motion for Summary Judgment Denied in
Antitrust Action- O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
No. CV 81-6132 (C.D.C.A. 1983).
The court rejected Apple's motion for summary judgment
in an action by O.S.C. Corp., under the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. section 1, to enjoin Apple from enforcing a prohibition
against the mail order sale of Apple products. The court
found evidence that dealers had complained to Apple about
price erosion due to competition from mail order sales of Apple products, and that Apple had responded to these complaints. The court further found some evidence that Apple intended to raise the product prices by imposing a mail order
prohibition.
While the court said that O.S.C. Corp. failed to establish
that Apple's mail order ban adversely affected competition,
"[n]onetheless, summary judgment for Apple is inappropriate
because plaintiffs allege price fixing, a per se violation of section 1 that, if true, does not require actual proof of a harmful
impact on competition."
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BANKING
Electronic Funds Transfer Act Construed- Kashanchi
v. Texas Commerce Medical Bank, 703 F.2d 936 (5th Cir.
1983).
Kashanchi brought an action under the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act (EFTA) alleging that the Texas Commerce Medical Bank (Bank) had transferred funds from her account pursuant to a telephone call made by an unknown person who
was not an owner of the account and had no right to order
such a transfer. The court held that Kashanchi had no action
under EFTA because "Congress intended to exclude from the
Act's coverage any transfer of funds initiated by a phone conversation between any natural person and an officer or employee of a financial institution, which was not made pursuant
to a prearranged plan and under which periodic and recurring
transfers were not contemplated." The court discussed various
aspects of the computer automation of banking as well as
Congress' intent to have EFTA apply in situations where the
lack of personal contact that accompanies automation increases the system's vulnerability to "fraud, embezzlement,
and unauthorized use."
Actions of Bank's Computer System Did Not Constitute Payment Or Acceptance of a Check- Nautilus
Leasing Services, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 1023, 195 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1983).
On December 1, 1978, Crocker National Bank's Item
Processing Department received a check made payable to
Nautilus Leasing Services, Inc. to be drawn on an account serviced by Crocker. Crocker's IBM Reader/Sorter system
stamped "paid" on the check, and on December 2, 1978 the
system posted the check to the appropriate account. On the
next business day, Crocker exercised a set-off against the account and returned the check to Nautilus as drawn on an account with insufficient funds. Crocker had totally depeleted
the account with its set-off.
The court held that the stamping of the check as "paid"
did not constitute acceptance or payment of the check by
Crocker. Further, the court held that the posting of the check
to the proper account did not constitute payment. In the
court's analysis, the exercise of the set-off by Crocker was le-
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gitimate and timely.
Nature of Computerized Banking Cited as Factor in
Court's Refusal to Freeze Account- Florida National
Bank at Orlando v. General Electric Credit Corp., 429 So. 2d
1247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
In explaining why it decided to quash an order enjoining
a bank from disposing of funds in a certain savings account,
the court noted that damages at law, simple restoration of the
money, provided an adequate remedy and that "[b]ank accounts are primarily debtor-creditor, bookkeeping relationships which can be wiped out or restored by a single entry or
direction to a computer." The court reasoned that the bank's
basic position as debtor to its depositors would not be altered
by administrative manipulations of the account. Thus, the
bank's liabilities and responsibilities as debtor would remain
despite an injunction or lack of one.
Receipt of Checks by Bank's Data Processing Centers Held to Trigger Time Period for Rejection of
Checks by Bank- South Sound National Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 672 P.2d 1194 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); South
Sound National Bank v. Citizens Valley Bank, 672 P.2d 1198
(Or. Ct. App. 1983).
Under Oregon banking regulations a payor bank is liable
to pay a worthless check if the bank, after the check has been
"presented and received," does not either settle for, pay, return or send notice of dishonor after midnight of the next
banking day. The issue in this case was whether worthless
checks were "presented and received" by a bank branch or
when they were received by the bank's data processing center.
An Idaho court had held that presentation and receipt did not
occur until the checks were physically received by a bank
branch, Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 584
P.2d 1242 (1978); an Alabama court had held that presentation and receipt were accomplished upon receipt by the data
processing center, Central Bank of Alabama v. Peoples National Bank of Huntsville, 401 So. 2d 14 (1981).
The Oregon court held that the data processing center is
an integral part of the bank branch and explained that "to
hold otherwise would be to distinguish between banks which
perform essential bookkeeping and accounting functions onpremise and banks which perform such functions off-pre-
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mise." Thus, the court held that presentation and receipt occurred when the checks were received by the bank's data
processing center.
Bank's Computerized Account Records AdmissibleWashington v. Ben-Neth, 663 P.2d 156 (Wash. Ct. App.
1983).
In a case involving a conviction for unlawful issuance of
checks, the defendant unsuccessfully claimed that the trial
court erred in admitting the bank's computer records of his
account transactions. Two bank officials, the supervisor of
customer services and an operations officer, offerred testimony
to provide a foundation for the admission of the hearsay
records. The court accepted the witnesses' testimony as to
how the records were created because the witnesses could be
regarded as custodians of the records even though neither had
created or supervised the creation of the computer records,
understood how the records were assembled at the computer
center or had ever been to the computer center. Although defendant also claimed that the records contained hearsay that
went to the heart of the issue at trial, the court held that the
records merely documented transactions and did not directly
prove knowledge of insufficient funds or intent to defraud.
CONTRACT
Computer Leasing Company Fails to Avoid Buy-Out
"Policy" Expressed in Lease Agreement MaterialsChelsea Industries, Inc. v. Accuray Leasing Corp., 699 F.2d
58 (1st Cir. 1983).
Chelsea Industries, Inc. (Chelsea) entered into a computer lease with Accuray Leasing Corp. In the "package" containing the lease document was a letter stating that it was Accuray's policy to allow a lessee to purchase the leased
equipment during the lease term at a price determined by a
formula contained in the letter. When Chelsea sought to exercise its purchase option, Accuray responded that the letter
was a policy statement only, not an addendum to the lease or
a binding contract term, and that Accuray would independently determine the price at which it would sell the computer to Chelsea. The court held that Chelsea reasonably believed that it was getting a purchase option, and the court

RECENT DECISIONS

1983]

1163

noted that if Accuray had intended the letter to be viewed as
nothing more than a statement of policy subject to change, "it
would have been simple to add the universally familiar caveat:
'This policy is subject to change without notice.'"
The court viewed Accuray's use of the package
unfavorably:
Defendant wished to be able to deposit the lease with a
bank as collateral for a loan, and it was best that the
bank be assured of the continuance of plaintiff's obligation ....

A buyout, particularly if it might be at a re-

duced price, could reduce the value of the security. From
the defendant's standpoint ...

the lease should not con-

tain an option. At the same time, plaintiff, who feared the
equipment might become obsolete, expressed a strong desire for an option-its second choice after defendant refused it a right for outright termination due to obsolescence. This dilemma defendant solved by leaving the
lease clear, and giving plaintiff a letter which it intended
plaintiff to believe to be an option.
CRT Distributor Brings Contract and Tort Actions
Against Manufacturer- Consolidated Data Terminals v.
Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1983).
Consolidated Data Terminals (CDT) entered into an
agreement to act as a distributor of Applied Digital Data Systems (ADDS) cathode-ray computer terminals (CRTs). Upon
ADDS's representations that its "Regent 100" CRTs would
operate at a speed of 19,200 baud and were inherently reliable, CDT sold Regent 100's to its customers. However, the Regent 100 model was plagued by design errors and, even after a
year of remedial efforts, ADDS could not get the Regent 100's
sold by CDT to perform to the original specifications.
After discontinuing its sales of Regent 100's for a while,
CDT then successfully bid on a contract to sell Intel Corporation 127 Regent 100's. However, upon learning of CDT's successful bid to Intel, ADDS submitted a lower price and received Intel's order. CDT then began selling terminals which
competed with ADDS's products. CDT also sued ADDS, alleging breach of warranty contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unlawful interference with
prospective business advantage, fraud in the inducement to
enter into the distributorship agreement and fraud and negli-
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gence in its sale of Regent 100's.
The court held that: (1) ADDS breached the warranty
created by its representations that the Regent 100 would perform at a speed of 19,200 baud even though ADDS's contract
of sale disclaimed all warranties other than a 90-day guarantee on parts and labor; (2) ADDS's limitation of CDT's remedies to only repair of the Regents was not per se or in fact
unconscionable; (3) ADDS's contractual limitation of remedy
to repair was defeated by ADDS's inability to repair the terminals; and (4) ADDS's contractual limitation of consequential damages incurred "in connection with the use of or the inability to use" the terminals was inapplicable since CDT's
consequential damages were based on loss of customer goodwill, not on problems on CDT's part with the use of the
terminals.
Because its profits from the sale of terminals other than
ADDS's CRTs more than offset the profits CDT could have
made had it continued as an ADDS distributor, the court held
that CDT could not recover as consequential damages the
profits it could have made had it continued to deal exclusively
in ADDS's products. The court also reversed and remanded
the lower court's findings of fraud and interference because
CDT had added these charges late in the trial and ADDS had
not had a fair opportunity to contest them.
Court Enforces Minimum Charge Provision in Computer Services Agreement- ADP-Financial Computer
Services v. First National Bank of Cobb County, 703 F.2d
1261 (11th Cir. 1983).
ADP entered into a three-year contract with First National Bank of Cobb County (the Bank) whereby ADP would
provide the Bank with five types of data processing services at
a charge based on actual use. Alternatively, if the use in any
month fell below the average use for the preceding six
months, the Bank would pay a monthly charge equal to eighty
percent of the average monthly charge for the services during
the immediately preceding six month period.
The Bank's new president and chief operating officer determined that substantial financial benefits would accrue to
him personally if he moved the Bank's data processing "in
house", purchased a computer and related equipment, and
then leased the computer to the Bank. When the Bank's inhouse capabilities caused it to decrease its level of use of three
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of the five services for which it had contracted with ADP, the
Bank paid only for its use of the remaining two services and
refused to honor the minimum monthly charge contract provision regarding the other three. ADP successfully sued for
eighty percent of the monthly charge due for the remainder of
the contract term as well as for ADP's attorney's fees and litigation costs.
On appeal, the Bank's primary contentions were: (1) the
minimum monthly charge provision constituted an unenforceable penalty and ADP should be forced to show actual damages; (2) the Bank's payment for the two services it continued
to use constituted an accord and satisfaction for the entire
contract; and (3) the jury's award of ADP's attorney's fees
and litigation costs was unsupported by the evidence. The
Bank's appeal was unsuccessful.
The court found that: (1) rather than being a penalty or
liquidated damage clause, the minimum monthly charge was,
in the absence of a contract termination, a charge for the
availability of the services; (2) there was no "meeting of the
minds" concerning an accord and satisfaction; and (3) there
was sufficient evidence of bad faith to support the award of
costs and fees. Also, the court held that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in disallowing the Bank's request to introduce surveys of ADP's customers for the purpose of showing
deficiencies in ADP's services.
Failure to Specify Programming Needs Precludes
Finding Of Contractual Obligations; Fraudulent Misrepresentation Must Be Made Regarding a Material
Element of the Transaction- Georgetown School of Science and Arts, Ltd. v. Microsystems Engineering Corp., -F.
Supp.- (D.D.C. 1984).
In an action involving, according to plaintiff, the basic issue of "whether computer companies, like other manufacturers of sophisticated equipment, owe a duty of fair disclosure
as to the performance of their computer hardware equipment
and their software programs to be used in the computer," the
court refused to hold a computer system developer liable for
the failure of a system to perform as desired by the purchaser.
Georgetown School of Science and Arts (GSSA) brought
the action against Microsystems Engineering Corporation
(MEC), a computer system developer, alleging that MEC: (1)
failed to satisfy its contractual obligation to develop a custom-
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ized business management system for GSSA; (2) failed to provide hardware eligible for warranty maintenance; (3) was liable for payment for work done by GSSA employees in the
development project; (4) breached an oral contract to provide
a satisfactory payroll and accounting system; and (5) engaged
in misrepresentation and fraud regarding the capabilities of
the hardware as well as the capabilities and operation of the
software to be provided to GSSA. MEC's president was also
alleged to be personally liable for his direct involvement in
MEC's dealings with GSSA.
The court found that the dealings between MEC and
GSSA were characterized by a lack of specificity regarding
programming needs and goals, and that there was no meeting
of the minds or definiteness in the terms of the agreements
sufficient to form a basis for a development contract, which
GSSA had attempted to show by a series of written letters. In
the court's words, there were two deficiencies in the "letter
agreement" offered to show the contract: (1) "there was no
listing of what programs the parties had actually agreed
upon;" and (2) there were no specifications in the purported
contract documents of the programs' specific requirements.
As to the oral contract charges, the court found that the
programming errors were "minor," and that the problems
with the programs' performance were probably due to inputting errors by GSSA personnel. Allegations of fraud and misrepresentation regarding the brand of computer components
supplied were not, in the court's view, substantiated. The
court found that the supply of components other than those
specified by GSSA were found to have caused no damage to
GSSA and any misrepresentations by MEC were not material
misrepresentations. Further, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that MEC contemplated at
the outset that GSSA personnel would become involved in
programming tasks to the extent that actually occurred during
the course of the project.
An interesting facet of the court's opinion was its finding
that an agreement by a developer to a delay in receiving payment, when programming activities were promptly undertaken, is inconsistent with an intent to defraud.
Purchaser's Reliance on Vendor's Representation
that Corrected or Operable System Will Be Provided
Does Not Toll Statute of Limitations in Filing of Tort
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Actions; Applicability of UCC to Software at IssueHartford Insurance Co. v. Seibels, Bruce and Co., 579 F.
Supp. 135 (D. Md. 1984).
On March 31, 1978, Hartford Insurance Company entered
into. a license agreement whereby Hartford purchased a program package called Policy Management System (PMS) from
Seibels, Bruce and Company (Siebels). In May, 1978, Hartford received version 5.1.2 of PMS, and in October received a
more advanced version designated Release 5.3. In May, 1981,
Hartford sought by letter to Seibels to rescind the agreement
because of alleged defects in the PMS system. In March, 1982,
Hartford filed an action against Seibels alleging: (1) breach of
express warranties; (2) breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC);
(3) breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose under the UCC; (4) breach of contract; (5) negligent
misrepresentation; and (6) fraud in the inducement.
The court decided, in considering Seibel's motion for
summary judgment and to strike, that the law of South Carolina applied to the contract actions by virtue of the contract's
choice-of-law provision. However, the law of Maryland, the forum State, applied to the tort claims of misrepresentation and
fraud.
Hartford's tort claims failed as a matter of law because
they had not been filed within the three-year period provided
by Maryland's statute of limitations. Maryland law provides
that a cause of action accrues when the wrong is discovered.
Hartford admitted that it knew of the system's problems
when it was delivered and that its employee learned at a June,
1978, training session that a fully operable system, the 5.3 version, had not yet been developed. However, as the court
noted, "plaintiff, understandably, appeared to adopt a 'wait
and see' attitude regarding the functioning of the system."
Hartford had relied on Seibel's representations that Release
5.3 would be a thoroughly tested, fully operable product.
This "understandable" action by Hartford, however, did
not dissuade the court from holding that Hartford's tort
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court
stated: "Because plaintiff's tort claims accrued in June of
1978, and this action was not filed until March of 1982, plaintiff's tort claims are barred. . . . Attempts do not toll the
statue of limitations."
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Hartford claimed that its contract actions were governed
by the six-year statute of limitations in South Carolina's UCC.
Because the court found that material facts were in dispute as
to whether the computer programs delivered to Hartford are
goods covered by the UCC or services which are not covered,
summary judgment on the contract statute of limitations issue
was denied.
As to Seibel's motion to strike Hartford's claim for actual
and consequential damages, the court found that: (1) a factual
dispute existed as to whether the agreement's limitation of
Hartford's remedies to correction or replacement failed in its
essential purpose due to Seibel's alleged inability to correct
PMS or to provide a workable system; (2) it was ambiguous as
to whether the license agreement's preclusion of consequential
damages applied only to suits by third parties; and (3) a factual dispute existed as to whether the totality of circumstances in the case made the preclusion of consequential damages unconscionable. Thus, Seibel's motion to strike was
denied.
Honeywell Found to Have Fraudulently Misrepresented the Capabilities and Reliability of Its System- Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Systems,
580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Based on Honeywell's representation concerning the capabilities and reliability of its "Level 6" hardware and "TL-6"
operating system software, Accusystems entered into agreements with Honeywell to enable Accusystems to: (1) serve as
an OEM for Honeywell, and (2) use the Honeywell systems in
Accusystems' operations as an independent service bureau for
small businessses.
The agreements, entered into on November 21, 1977, limited Accusystems' remedy concerning defective equipment to
repair or replacement of the equipment; Accusystems' remedy
regarding software was limited to 10% of the charges for the
software or $5,000, whichever was less. The Level 6 equipment
was delivered and installed in February, 1978, and the TL-6
software was delivered in March, 1978. In February, 1978,
Honeywell issued a document, which Accusystems received,
describing the Level 6 equipment and TL-6 software as complete and thoroughly tested. The document also described the
multi-tasking capabilities of the system.
After it experienced numerous difficulties with the system
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and was subsequently forced to go out of business, Accusystems sued Honewell for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence. Accusystems alleged that Honeywell had negligently
carried out its service obligations and that Honeywell's provision of advice and assistance to Accusystems placed a special
duty of care on Honeywell separate and apart from the
agreements.
The court found that although there was insufficient evidence that Honeywell had negligently carried out its service
obligations, there was no special relationship between Accusystems and Honeywell, only a vendor-purchaser relationship. As to the allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation by
Honeywell prior to the agreements and in the descriptive document of February, 1978, the court found that Honeywell had
made the representations with knowledge of their falsity or
with recklessness in not knowing whether they were true or
false.
Among the evidence that supported this finding was the
fact that "no recorded tests of the TL-6 [had been] conducted
by Honeywell until more than a year after the sale to Accusystems and . . . when these tests were conducted, they established that the TL-6 ran at a high risk and produced below
average quality with mixed mode, multi-user transactions."
Contractor Enjoined From Using Robotics Technology Developed on Client's Project- Textron, Inc. v.
Teleoperator Systems, 554 F. Supp. 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Textron obtained a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction against competitive use by Teleoperator Systems Corporation (TS) of robotics technology developed by TS during the course of a product development project for Textron. TS had never expressly agreed to terms in
Textron's letter of intent and in other materials indicating
that Textron owned the proprietary rights to developments
that occurred in the course of the project, while TS would
maintain a right to use the developments in noncompetitive
contexts. Nonetheless, the court held that TS's failure to object, and its undertaking and continuance of work on the project, constituted a binding assent to the terms. However, the
court found that the parties had not agreed to limit TS to
noncompetitive use of developments made by TS prior to the
project, but used in the project.
The court enjoined TS from use of the technology devel-
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oped during the project finding that Textron would have otherwise been deprived of valuable "lead time" in the pertinent
sector of the robotics market.
Florida Court Refuses to Enforce Limitation of Action Provision; Discovery on Unrelated Sale of Identical Computer System Allowed- Suntogs of Miami,
Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
Suntogs, a clothing manufacturer, purchased a B700 computer system from Burroughs to operate with a software package entitled the "Silton Apparel Package." After experiencing
problems with the system, Suntogs brought an action alleging
breach of contract and warranties, negligent performance and
fraud.
Burroughs' contract provided that actions on the contract
must be brought within two years of the occurrence and that
the law of Michigan, Burroughs' home state, would apply. The
court held that, in light of Florida's strong public policy
against contract provisions that seek to impose a limitationof-action period that is shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations, Burroughs' limitation-of-action
term would not be enforced. The court took this position even
though Michigan law would have upheld the limitation-of-action term in Burroughs' contract.
The court also held that Suntogs could seek discovery
from Burroughs regarding a previous sale of a B700/Silton
software system to another clothing manufacturer. The court
reasoned that such discovery might shed light on whether
Burroughs knew of problems with the system before the sale
and allegedly false representations to Suntogs.
Burroughs Loses Computer Lease Dispute- Burroughs Corp. v. Century Steel Inc., 664 P.2d 354 (Nev. 1983).
Century Steel (Century) arranged to obtain a Burroughs
minicomputer system through a lease arrangement with Nevada National Leasing Co. (National). In a suit arising from
Century's dissatisfaction with the system and refusal to pay
lease payments, Century sued Burroughs to recover the payments Century made to the leasing company and the cost of
storage of the Burroughs computer system after Century had
replaced it with a "Wang" system.
Burroughs argued that it had contracted with National
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and that Century was barred from recovery against Burroughs
because there was no privity of contract between them. The
court, however, analyzed the transaction and determined that
the "lease" arrangement was actually a sale of equipment to
Century with National providing the financing.
Although Burroughs claimed that the problems with Century's system arose from input errors, the court accepted the
testimony of a Century official who had computing experience
that the problems arose from programming errors. However,
the court found that Century did not submit sufficient evidence to establish the amount of storage costs; thus storage
costs were not awarded.
Accord And Satisfaction Defense Discussed in ComChannave v. Kraai, 466
puter Purchase ContextN.Y.S.2d 916 (1983).
In holding that the defense of accord and satisfaction is
available in actions for payment for services where services
predominate and goods are only incidental to the transaction,
the court noted that, "[iln cases where the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable, such as [in] the sale of computers, a
creditor by complying with [section] 1-207 can reserve his
rights although he accepts a check being conditioned as payment in full."
Note that the characterization of the sale of programs, for
tax purposes, as services may allow this case to be interpreted
as permitting the application of accord and satisfaction in a
program sales dispute.
Leasing Company's Knowledge That Leasing Party
Had Not Yet Received Software Does Not Preclude
Enforcement of Lease Based on Its Provision That
The Goods Were Already Received and Were Acceptable- Bancorp Leasing and FinancialCorp. v. Brunner,672
P.2d 357 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
Brunner purchased a computer system and was to receive
from the vendor special software for use in her tax consulting
service. Prior to her receipt of this software, Brunner entered
into a sale-lease back agreement whereby she agreed that the
"property" was in good and suitable working order, received
purchase money from the leasing company and agreed to pay
monthly lease payments. The leasing company was aware that
Brunner had not received the tax software. After Brunner re-
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ceived the tax software and found it unworkable, she refused
to make any more lease payments on the system.
The court rejected the leasing company's argument that
the transaction was a secured loan transaction rather than a
lease contract subject to recission. In the court's words, "the
terms of the lease itself

. . .

rule out the acquisition of any

equity in the property by the 'lessee.'" The court held that
even though the lessor's agent knew that Brunner had not yet
received the tax software, "it would be anomalous to the point
of being inequitable to place the risk on the lessor-financer
who does not deal in goods of the kind involved, did not select
the goods, has no knowledge concerning them and expressly
disclaimed any such responsibility." Thus, the court held that
the lessor had fully performed its duty under the lease to supply purchase funds, and that there was no failure of consideration as to that agreement.
COPYRIGHT
Object Code, ROM Embodiments and Operating System Programs Held Copyrightable- Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir.
1983), cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
Apple Computer (Apple) charged Franklin Computer
(Franklin) with copying, and thereby violating Apple's copyright rights in fourteen of Apple's operating system programs.
Franklin did not dispute the charge of copying, but advanced,
without success, several arguments against the copyrightability of operating system programs, object code and programs
fixed in ROM.
As to the copyrightability of object code, the court noted
that computer programs are clearly within the ambit of copyrightable subject matter, and that "the definition of 'computer
program' adopted by Congress in the 1980 amendments [to
the Copyright Act] is sets of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result" (emphasis added by court). The court concluded
that as only object code can be used directly by a computer,
programs in object code are within the coverage of the Copyright Act.
Based on White-Smith Music Publishing v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1 (1908), the district court questioned whether copy-
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right extends to such work as a program embodied in ROM,
which may be deciphered but is not intended to be read by
human beings. The court found White had been expressly discredited by Congress. The court further found that computer
programs in object code are within the Copyright Act's definition of "literary work" because that definition encompasses
expression in numerical symbols as well as in words.
Video Game Copyright Upheld- Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International,Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.
1983).
Midway owns the copyrights in the audiovisual display
portion of the "Galaxian" and "Pac-Man" video games. At issue in this copyright infringement suit were two printed circuit boards sold by Artic. One board speeded up the rate of
play of the Galaxian game; the other board, in the court's
words, "store[d] a set of images and sounds almost identical
to that stored in the circuit boards of plaintiff's 'Pac-Man'
video game machine so that the video games people play on
machines containing defendant's circuit board look and sound
virtually the same as plaintiff's 'Pac-Man' game." Midway obtained a preliminary injunction against Artic forbidding the
manufacture and sale of circuit boards that produced games
substantially simlar to Midway's copyrighted games.
In affirming the issuance of the injunction, the court held:
(1) Midway's video games are audiovisual works protectable
under the 1976 Copyright Act; this status is unaffected by the
fact that the person playing a video game can vary the order
in which the images stored in the game program appear on
the screen; (2) the fact that a circuit board is patentable does
not mitigate against the copyrightability of the work stored on
the board; (3) Midway's works are protected by the 1976 Copyright Act; this protection was not affected by the passage of
the 1980 amendment of section 117 of the Act; (4) even if the
Japanese companies from which Midway purchased its copyrights in the games had published the games in Japan without
notice, section 405(a)(2) of the Copyright Act affords a copyright owner five years to remedy such an omission, and "defendant [did] not allege that plaintiff [had] omitted to put a
notice of copyright on any of the machines plaintiff [had] distributed in the United States or that its alleged infringement
of plaintiff's copyrights was in reliance upon the omission of
such notice from those copies originally published in Japan;"
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and (5) the speeded up version of the Galaxian game constituted an infringing derivative work.
Court Confronts Derivative Work, Certificate of Registration and Oral License Issues in Program Licensing Case- Freedman v. Select Information Systems,
Inc., No. C-82-6448WAI (N.D. Cal. 1983).
In a dispute between a program developer and a corporation that, under an unwritten license, the corporation modified and distributed the developer's programs, the court determined that, "to the extent that the program which [was]
marketed by the defendant corporation incorporate[d] some
or all of plaintiff's copyrighted programs, it constitute[d] a derivative work."
As to the dispute over ownership rights to the derivative
work, the court held that this was irrelevant. If plaintiff
owned the copyright in the underlying work, the court held
that he could still halt distribution of the derivative work regardless of whether or not he had authored or owned the copyright in the new modules in the modified program.
In allowing the preliminary injunction against defendant's modified version of the program, the court found that
the defendant had not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of ownership raised by plaintiff's certificate of copyright registration for the original work. The court
also held that a nonexclusive copyright license was not required to be in writing by 17 U.S.C. section 204(a), and that
California law would apply to determine the limits and effects
of the parties' oral commitments and representations regarding the license agreement.
Modification Kit Infringes Copyright in "Pac-Man"
Program Even Though It Does Not Infringe "PacMan" AudiovisualsMidway Manufacturing Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Midway Manufacturing Company (Midway), owner of the
copyright and trademark rights to the video game, "PacMan," filed a motion to find Strohon and other defendants
(referred to collectively as "Strohon") in civil contempt of a
preliminary injunction against infringing Midway's rights in
the Pac-Man game. The contempt action arose from Strohon's
advertisement of a modification kit, "Cute-See," which
changed the audiovisual and certain play features of the Pac-
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Man game. The kit, which contained five ROMs, also included
labels that covered several, but not all, of the Pac-Man marks
that appeared on the video game cabinet. As an alternative to
a finding of contempt, Midway asked that the injunction be
modified to specifically preclude the sale of the Cute-See
modification kit.
The court held that the audiovisual display produced by
the Cute-See kit did not infringe on the Pac-Man audiovisual
display. However, the court found that the program embodied
in the Cute-See ROMs infringed upon the program contained
in the Pac-Man ROMs. The court specifically rejected the arguments that object code is not copyrightable and that ROMs
are utilitarian items incapable of copyright protection.
The court explained its finding of substantial similarity,
i.e., copyright infringement (access having been admitted) by
noting in part that Midway had established at the hearing
that 89% of the 16,000 bytes in the Pac-Man ROMs were
identically reproduced in the corresponding Cute-See ROMs.
In addition, Midway showed that 13,382 of the more than
16,000 bytes, contained actual sequencing instructions, as distinct from data that appears directly on the screen.
Midway had contended that because the Cute-See kit
could be installed without changing the Pac-Man audiovisuals, Strohon was guilty of contributory infringement of the audiovisual work. However, the court rejected this position in
light of the fact that the Cute-See installation instructions
specifically provided that the Pac-Man audiovisual ROM
should be removed.
The court also held that the Pac-Man markings that remained on the game even after application of the Cute-See
labels gave rise to a likelihood that customers would conclude
that the Cute-See kit "emanate[d] from Midway," and that
this likelihood of confusion violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The court refused to find Strohon in contempt because no
Cute-See kits had been sold, although the court modified the
injunction to restrain Strohon from marketing the kit.
Exclusive Right to Distribute Is Not Property Right
Capable of Being Stolen- Illinois v. Zakarian, 460
N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
The owner of exclusive rights to manufacture and distribute recordings of certain musical artists charged a maker
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and seller of unauthorized recordings with felony theft of exclusive rights in sound recording. The court cited Illinois Rev.
Stat. 1981, ch. 38, which includes "computer programs, prototypes or models thereof," and found that the exclusive right in
question was not a property right capable of being stolen
under the terms of the statute.
Note that this case, as well as federal preemption principles, would seem to prevent a theft action against a software
"pirate" based on his theft of an exclusive, contract-based
right to distribute copyrighted software.
CRIMINAL
Placement of Fugitive's Name in Computer System
Does Not Constitute Search for Fugitive- United
States v. Singleton, 702 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
In considering whether Singleton was a fugitive from justice so as to toll the statute of limitations on a Bail Reform
Act charge, the court indicated the placement of Singleton's
name in the National Crime Information Center computer
was not sufficient to constitute a search for Singleton.
Computerized Traffic Ticket System Violates Fourth
Amendment- Smith v. Oklahoma City, 696 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1983).
Smith, arrested on a charge of accumulated unpaid traffic
tickets, successfully claimed that the arrest warrant was invalid under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution because of infirmities in the computerized system that
produced the information supporting the warrant.
Because Oklahoma law provides that a vehicle's license
plates are transferred with the sale of the vehicle, the court
found that the computer listing of the vehicle's current owner
did not establish that the current owner was the individual
who had received the unpaid tickets. The court thus held that
the warrant in question had not been issued in conformance
with the probable cause requirements of the Constitution.
Computerized Check Printer Figures in Theft- Palms
v. Alabama, 431 So.2d 1373 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
Theft of blank checks from a community college was
made possible by the fact that, due to the school's computer
printer's method of operation, with each imprinting run a few
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checks would pass through unimprinted or blank.
Arrest Based on Erroneous Computer File Information Held Invalid- People v. Ramirez, 34 Cal. 3d 541, 194
Cal. Rptr. 454 (1983).
Arrest based on police computer file's erroneous information that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Ramirez
was unlawful even though arresting officer had good faith belief that the information was correct. The court held that police cannot benefit from their negligent maintenance of computer files, and evidence found during arrest must be
suppressed.
Testimony Regarding Police Computer Check Allowed Over Hearsay Objection- Evans v. Georgia, 306
S.E.2d 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
Defendants, convicted of trafficking in marijuana, challenged, inter alia, testimony of the arresting Customs officer
that information from a computer check prior to searching the
airplane containing the marijuana had revealed that the airplane was outside of the United States prior to a certain date.
The challenge was based on the alleged hearsay nature of the
testimony. However, the court held that the testimony was allowable as "it explained the conduct of [the officer] in asking
appellants for identification, and in requesting permission to
look in the airplane."
Reliability Of Computer-Assisted Identification Instrument Unsuccessfully Challenged- State v. Cannady, 660 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1983).
Defendant in a criminal drug case unsucessfully challenged the reliability of a computer-assisted drug identification instrument known as a GCMS. The GCMS aids in the
identification of drugs by searching its "computer library" and
printing out the names of drugs that most closely match the
substance being tested. Although the court noted that it
would have been preferable if the state had affirmatively established more details relative to the functioning of the
GCMS on the day the testing of the drug occurred, the court
held that the acceptance of the GCMS result by the expert
who operated it was sufficient to establish, in absence of contrary evidence, the reliability and proper functioning of the
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GCMS.
Computer Printout Pinpoints Time of Crime's Occurrance- In re Lamont, 469 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1983).
In a criminal case where an alibi witness testified as to
the whereabouts of the defendant at a particular time, a computer tape printout which recorded the time that the report of
the crime in progress was received by the police was accepted
to establish the time of the crime.
DISCOVERY
Plaintiff in Employment Discrimination Action Entitled to Information About Defendant's Computer
System- Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1983).
In an employment discrimination action, Celanese was
granted a protective order which denied plaintiff access to information regarding personnel files, including "identifying
characteristics of Celanese's computer facilities." In overturning the protective order, the court of appeals noted: "While
some . . . [of the information sought by plaintiff] . .. might
be of questionable relevance to a simple action for failure to
hire, much of it would be highly relevant in proving a continuing pattern of discrimination in an integrated enterprise's promotion and transfer system."
Litigant's Failure to Provide Computer Printouts at
Discovery Stage Proves Damaging- Alabama Farm
Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Boswell, 430 So. 2d
462 (Ala. 1983).
An insurance company failed to supply computer
printouts relating to the sales history of a former agent who
claimed that commissions were owed to him by the company.
When the insurance company lost at trial, it unsuccesfully attempted to secure relief from the judgment based on its "discovery" of the allegedly misplaced sales history records.
EMPLOYMENT
Employer's Need to Fill Computer-Related Position
Affects Immigrants Residence Status- American In-
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dustries, Inc. v. Feldman, 722 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1983).
A company had a need to fill a permanent position for a
computerized lathe operator, but was unable to find a United
States citizen willing and capable of filling the position. Thus,
the person who had filled the position for several years, an
immigrant, was granted a permanent labor certification and
sixth-preference immigrant status entitling him to file an application for permanent residence.
Use of Computer-Assisted Studies in Discrimination
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Cases DiscussedRichmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983).
A case involving race discrimination in promotion policies
contains an extensive discussion of the nature and use of computer-assisted econometric/statistic analyses in determining
whether discrimination occurred.
Computer Analysis Is Basis of EEOC Action- EEOC
v. Neches Butane Products Co., 704 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1983).
A computer analysis indicating that Neches "underemployed" blacks, Hispanics, and women was the basis of the
decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
Houston office to bring charges against the company under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Court Upholds Honeywell's Policies Regarding Employees Who Have Business Interests That May Conflict With Honeywell's Interests- Moore v. Honeywell
Information Systems, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1229 (D. Ha. 1983).
Plaintiff and her husband, Honeywell employees, formed
their own computer company to sell small computers in Hawaii. Honeywell informed plaintiff and her husband that
plaintiff's small computer business violated Honeywell's policy forbidding a Honeywell employee from engaging in any activity or becoming involved in any arrangement "directly or
indirectly through a family member" which would conflict, or
be reasonably viewed as conflicting, with his or her responsibilities at Honeywell. While plaintiff agreed to cease her involvement in the small computer business, her husband refused to do so and Honeywell discharged them both.
The court held that Honeywell did not violate either Hawaii's Employment Practices Act or Hawaii's Married Woman's Act. Essentially, the court reasoned that Honeywell's
action was not predicated simply on plaintiff's marital status,
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but upon a legitimate recognition that plaintiff retained an interest, through a close relative, in an enterprise that could
give rise to concerns that would conflict with her responsibilities to Honeywell. Also, although Honeywell did not sell small
computers in Hawaii, the court reasoned that proprietary information held by Honeywell, such as market studies, would
be very attractive to a small computer business, and there
would be an enhanced risk of misappropriation if an employee
engaged independently in a computer business.
Accessibility of Computerized Employee Information
Cited in Employer-Employee Dispute- Becnel v. Answer, Inc., 428 So.2d 539 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
The court held that an employer's failure to comply with
a statute requiring that discharged employees be paid in full
within three days was negligent and unreasonable because the
ex-employees' work records were "literally at the company's
fingertips on the [company's] computers."
Computer Consultant Entitled to Unemployment
Benefits Even Though She Quit Job- Central Data
Corp. v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, 458 A.2d 335 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
Former computer systems consultant was held qualified
for unemployment benefits even though she voluntarily terminated her employment. She successfully alleged that the stress
inherent in her duties, which included responding to computer malfunctions, caused emotional problems that made it
imperative that she quit her job.
Stress of Automated Workplace Found to Aggravate
Heart Condition- Copperweld Corporation v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board, 458 A.2d 651 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983).
In upholding an award of workmen's compensation benefits to the widow of a deceased employee, the court accepted
an expert's testimony that stress from the decedent's employment aggravated his pre-existing hyper-sensitive cardiovascular disease and contributed to his death. The court stated that
"[i]n the several years prior to his death, the employee's work
responsibilities as payroll clerk had escalated dramatically by
reason of the retirement of his supervisor whose duties he assumed and the computerization of the payroll office for which
he was responsible."
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EVIDENCE

Computer Evidence Does Not Support ICC ActionChesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co. v. United States 704 F.2d
373 (7th Cir. 1983).
In vacating an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) allowing a railroad to cancel a large number of joint rates, the court found that the results of a "massive computer study" undertaken by the railroad had been
presented to the Commisssion in a grossly aggregative and
summary form incapable of supporting the Commissions order. The court also noted: "The Commission did not even require Conrail to make the underlying computer tapes and programs available to the petitioners until seven days before their
rebuttal evidence was due. This was not enough time ....

It

is routine practice in lawsuits in which computer studies are
used as evidence to give the opponent's computer experts access to the tapes well in advance of trial."
Use of Voice Identification to Gain Access to Computer Systems Figures in Discussion of Reliability of
Voice Spectography- Cornett v. Indiana, 450 N.E.2d 496
(Ind. 1983).
One of the factors relied on to support an argument that
voice spectrograms should not be admitted into evidence in a
criminal trial was that, "[e]ven with sophisticated voice identification systems used by companies like Texas Instruments,
where speaker verifications are used as one method to prevent
unauthorized access to the computers, [defendant's expert]
stated that other safeguards are also needed."
Court Makes Evidentiary Distinction Between Computer-Stored and Computer-Generated StatementsLouisiana v. Armstead, 432 So.2d 837 (La. 1983).
Defendant, convicted for making obscene telephone calls,
argued that the state failed to lay a proper foundation for
computer printout evidence that documented the calls and
their origin. In rejecting defendant's hearsay challenge to the
computer printout, the court reasoned that:
Since the computer is actually responsible for making the
telephone connection, the computer can be programmed
to record the source of any incoming call....

Therefore,

the evidence in this case was generated solely by the elec-
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trical and mechanical operations of the computer and
telephone equipment, and was not dependent upon the
observations and reporting of a human declarant.
Thus, the court held that the printout was not hearsay
evidence and did not have to be qualified as a business record;
the printout was a computer-generated record of the computer's operation, not simply the stored statements of a
human declarant.
Criminal Defendant Entitled To Examine Individual
Who Searched Police Computer Records- New York v.
Alvarez, 466 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1983).
The court held that the questions of whether the police
computer would contain a record of a request to check a vehicle's license plate, and whether this information would be indicated on a computer printout, had great bearing on the
credibility of officers who claimed to have made such a request prior to approaching a vehicle with guns drawn. Therefore, an individual arrested when the officers approached the
vehicle had a right to compel production of both the radio dispatcher on duty at the time and the computer operator who
searched for information regarding the request.
Computer-Assisted Speed Clocking Devices Have a
Presumption of AccuracyWisconsin v. Frankenthal,
335 N.W.2d 890 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
Court held that because of the established acceptance of
stationary radar speed detection, a presumption of accuracy
was to be afforded to the "Visual Average Speed Computer
and Recorder" (VASCAR) clocking of speed of defendant's
vehicle. Thus, no expert testimony was necessary to establish
the scientific reliability and accuracy of the VASCAR unit.
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
Computer-Assisted Mass Mailing of Welfare Reduction Notices Upheld- Le Beau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639
(1st Cir. 1983).
Massachusetts' plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf
of all recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
who received or will receive computer-generated termination
or reduction notices from the state resulting from recent
changes in eligibility and benefit level standards. The court
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denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction restraining reduction or termination of benefits because, in the
court's view, the contents of the notices satisfied federal and
state regulatory and due process requirements. The court indicated that mass mailings accompanying across-the-board
benefit reductions may be subject to a lower due process standard than "where the reduction or termination of aid is on an
individual basis."
Computer Capability Defeats State's Claim That
Calculations Present Burdensome Administrative
Difficulty- Frazier v. Manson, 703 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1983).
This case involved a Connecticut statute, which increased
"good time credit" for prison inmates sentenced after October
1, 1976. Plaintiff argued that the statute violated equal protection by improperly discriminating against inmates sentenced prior to that date. The court rejected the state's argument that administrative difficulty in calculating good time
credit of inmates sentenced prior to October 1, 1976, was an
acceptable rationale for the failure of the statute to apply retroactively. In the court's view: "Given today's computer facilities, which Connecticut should be able to put at its disposal,
we may reasonably infer that '[a]ny administrative inconvenience would be minimal.'"
Court Allows Criminal Charges Against Computer
Company- United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689
F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982).
In a criminal case involving a charge that Computer Science Corporation (CSC) defrauded the United States government by overbilling the General Services Administration for
computer services, the court held, inter alia, that: (1) the government could use 18 U.S.C. section 287, the statute outlawing false claims against the government, 18 U.S.C. section
1341, the mail fraud statute, and 18 U.S.C. section 1343, the
wire fraud statute, as simultaneous .bases of prosecution; (2)
the division of CSC involved in the alleged fraud was an "enterprise" within the purview of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); and (3) because the term
"enterprise", as used in RICO, is intended to "refer to a being
different from, not the same as or part of, the person" to
whom RICO is applied, charges based on holding CSC distinct
from the corporate division involved in the alleged fraud had
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to be dismissed.
City Can Void Unauthorized Computer System
Lease- City of Zanesville v. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp.,
468 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1983).
The City of Zanesville, Ohio, cancelled a computer lease
contract by which it received and made lease payments on a
system, on the basis that the city's director of administration
had not followed the procedures set out by law for the granting of a contract that creates a liability on the part of a municipal corporation. Mohawk unsuccessfully sought arbitration
in accordance with the provisions of the lease agreement. Mohawk brought an action in New York, under the contract's
choice of New York law provision, to secure a holding that the
New York law allowing municipal corporations to enter into
public contracts without bidding applied to-the lease, and to
estop Zanesville from challenging the validity of the contract
because Mohawk had satisfactorily performed its obligations
thereunder and the city had accepted the benefits of the
performance.
The court held that: (1) both Ohio and New York law
provide that contracts made on behalf of municipal corporations must be made pursuant to proper statutory authorization and procedure, and those contracting with municipal
agents and officers bear the risk of loss where the contract
arises in an unauthorized manner; (2) both Ohio and New
York law provide that receipt by a municipal corporation of
benefits of a contract does not estop the municipality from
challenging the validity of the contract as arising from an unauthorized or unlawful act of a municipal employee; and (3)
since the contract was void, its arbitration clause was
unenforceable.
Computer Capabilities of State Legislature Does Not
Mitigate Against Governor's Obligation to Furnish
Legislature with Information- Lewis v. Thornburgh;
462 A.2d 310 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
The Minority Chairman of the Pennsylvania Senate Appropriations Committee sought from the Governor certain
personnel and fiscal information about all the lawyers on the
public payroll or hired by the Executive Branch on public
contract. The Executive Branch argued that the information
was available by "culling it from a mass of printouts or com-
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puter tape reports now submitted to the Legislature. . . or by
researching it in the State Library or the State Treasury Department." However, the court noted that the legislature and
its data-processing facilities rely on information from the Executive Branch, which has basic control over the data's format. The court held that the Executive Branch was obligated
to supply the information to the Legislature as it was not feasible to require the Legislature to unearth and compile the
information.
MISCELLANEOUS
"Lexis" Research Charges Not Recoverable as Litigation Costs- Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702
F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
In an age discrimination suit, the court reversed an award
of $145.89 to the plaintiff for "Lexis" research as part of an
award of costs, stating, "We believe that computer-aided research, like any other form of legal research, is a component
of attorneys' fees and cannot be independently taxed as an
item of cost in addition to the attorneys' fee award."
Computerized Billing System Figures in Insurance
Case- Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1983).
The National Floor Insurers Association (NFIA)
processes its policy renewal notices by computer. After several
years of providing notice, NFIA failed to notify plaintiff that
premiums were due, and later, that her policy had been cancelled. Plaintiff, unaware of the lapse in coverage, filed a claim
for flood damage and the claim was denied. Subsequently, the
court held that plaintiff had a cause of action against NFIA.
Junior Creditor Can Levy Upon and Force Sale of a
Computer System- American Financial Corp. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Del. 1983).
American Financial Corporation (AFC), through a lease
agreement, held a perfected security interest in computer systems used by Transportation Data Communications (TDC).
TDC, in turn, entered into an agreement whereby Computer
Sciences Corporation (CSC), maintained and repaired the
computer systems. When TDC became insolvent, CSC levied
on the systems and had them sold to satisfy debts incurred by
TDC under its agreement with CSC.
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AFC, claiming a superior creditor's position, unsuccessfully attempted to recover against CSC by claiming that: (1) it
was a third party beneficiary of the contract between TDC
and CSC since the lease required that TDC enter into a maintenance agreement; (2) theories under bailment and conversion principles could be asserted by AFC against CS; and (3)
levy and sale by a junior creditor is impermissible under Delaware law. The court specifically explained that extrinsic evidence to show that parties to a contract contemplated a third
party beneficiary is allowable only when the contract indicates
the party so contemplated. The court strengthened its position by noting that the maintenance agreement specifically excluded conferring beneficiary status to parties other than
TDC and CSC.
The court entered summary judgment against AFC on
the theories discussed above, but held that issues of fact remained regarding AFC's charge that CSC had bargained in
bad faith with AFC regarding one of the computers leased by
TDC.
Foreign Corporation's Use of New York Business'
Computer System Does Not Confer Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporation- Arbitron Co. v. E. W. Scripps,
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The court held that the fact that a foreign corporation
accused of copyright infringement and related torts utilized
the computer services of a business located in New York was
not sufficient to give the New York court system personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. The court distinguished an earlier case where jurisdiction was based on,
among other factors, the fact that the employee of a defendant installed and serviced a computer in New York that was
leased from the defendant, stating: "The sale or servicing of a
product
in
New
York
is
plainly
different
from. . .[the]. . .purchase of New York companies' computer
or printing services."
Lawyers Successfully Challenge Restriction on Advertisement of Computer Expertise- Spencer v. The
Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Penn. 1984).
In an attempt to further his desire to practice computer
and aviation law, Spencer sought to communicate his experi-
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ence as a pilot and computer programmer through general advertisements to the public and direct mailings to prospective
clients. Spencer challenged the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania Disciplinary Rule that would prohibit him from advising or directing advertising to potential clients that he was an
"experienced" pilot and an "experienced" computer programmer. The court however, upheld the state's prohibition of the
use of terms "which subjectively evaluate a lawyer's credentials or the quality of his services."
The court also held that the absolute ban on direct mail
solicitations was: (1) unconstitutionally vague in its allowance
of advertisement, but not solicitation; and (2) unconstitutionally broad in its total ban on a form of communication that
can be both accurate and useful to the public. Further, the
court struck down as unconstitutionally restrictive the Disciplinary Rule that provided that any statement or announcement that a lawyer's practice is limited to one or more particular fields of law must be accompanied by a disclaimer that
the lawyer is not recognized or certified as a specialist in those
fields. Finally, the court held that the Disciplinary Rules prohibition of a lawyer's representation of his background, education and experience to other lawyers who might wish to engage him as a consultant or associate was unnecessary to
advance any state interest and was therefore unconstitutional.
Modified Computer Record of Inventory Figures in
Franchise Dispute- Ferreirav. Quik Stop Markets, Inc.,
141 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 190 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1983).
Secretary-treasurer of franchisee manually overrode the
company computer and added a fictitious amount to the inventory of a particular fanchiser's store, thus inflating the
profit figure reported for the store. This error was perpetuated
in the system and, when discovered, was a source of dispute
between the parties.
Company's Computerized Customer Files Figure in
Class Certification- Lazar v. Hertz, 143 Cal. App. 3d 128,
191 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1983).
Car rental company's computer records "bearing upon
the identity of customers" were among the factors considered
by a court in its determination that a number of allegedly
overcharged customers should be granted class certification.
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Cluttering of Police Computer Files Noted as a Reason to Avoid Mandatory Registration of Certain
Kinds of Sex Offenders- In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 663
P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).
In holding that a mandatory permanent registration of
sex offenders under a misdemeanor disorderly conduct statute
violated the California Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment provision, the court noted:
Interestingly, the Los Angeles Attorney asserts in his amicus curiae brief that in fact the mandatory registration of
section 647(a) Misdemeanants as sex offenders is "dysfunctional." When the city used its fingerprint identification computer to attempt to identify the "Hillside Strangler," for example, the computer apparently produced the
identities of "thousands" of persons convicted of indecent
exposure and lewd conduct but failed to identify the
"Strangler." The city attorney explains that in addition
to overloading computers with useless information (the
so-called "garbage in, garbage out" effect), the registration requirement is "counterproductive" in two further
respects. According to amicus, "because of the perceived
draconian effect of registration" courts have limited the
reach of section 647(a) to "make the crime fit the
punishment."
Insurer's Deficient Computerized Filing System Provides Excuse for Mistaken Payment- Kennedy v. Hospital Service Corp., 455 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
Insurer's mistaken payment for insured's hospital stay
which exceeded policy limit arose from a deficiency in the insurer's computerized filing system and, as payment was made
without knowledge that the limitation had been passed, could
not constitute a waiver of the limitation.
Complexity of Computer Printouts Listing Accounting Information Excuses Parties' Failure to Appreciate the Significance of the Information- Hall-Hottel
Co., Inc. v. Oxford Square Cooperative, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 25
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
In an action where a cooperative housing corporation successfully charged a manager with witholding excessive and unauthorized management fees, the court found that, even
though the manager provided the cooperative with accurate
monthly accounting statements, the cooperative could not be
blamed for failure to apprise itself of the management fee be-
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cause the accounting statements were on lengthy complex
computer printouts.
Court Rejects Constitutional Challenge to Denial of
Video Game License- Caswell v. Licensing Commission
for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. 1983).
Caswell appealed the decision of the Licensing Commisssion for Brockton (Commission) denying him a license to
operate a video game arcade at a particular location. In rejecting Caswell's argument that the playing of video games
was a form of speech or expression protected by the United
States and Massachusetts, the court concluded that Caswell
"[f]ailed to demonstrate that video games import sufficient
communicative, expressive or informative elements to constitute expression protected under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution or Art. 16 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, as amended by Art. 77 of the
Amendments."
In rejecting Caswell's argument that patrons of video
game arcades have a right of assembly protected by the
United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the court concluded that there was no identifiable group of video game players, and that even if there was,
"gathering in an amusement arcade for the purpose of playing
video games would not advance the social, legal, and economic
benefits of the group's members in the way that the freedom
of association contemplates."
The court decided, however, that the Commission had to
reconsider Caswell's application for a license because it appeared that the Commission had applied an inappropriate
standard.
Address of Computerized Billing Service Used to
Serve Process on User of the Service- Gabriel v. Beth
Israel Medical Center, 467 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1983).
Defendant anesthesiologists were estopped from asserting
defective personal service of the summons and complaint in a
malpractice action. The plaintiff effected service at the address given on defendant's bills, which was the address of defendant's computerized billing service. The court held that
plaintiff had effected proper service because: (1) the billing,
an important part of defendant's business, was conducted at
the billing service address; and (2) by failing to make clear
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that the billing service address was not a business address of
defendants, they "cloaked the billing service with apparent
authority to receive service on behalf of themselves."
PATENT
Computer-Related Patent Held Invalid- In re Kaslow,
707 F.2d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
A patent application concerning a method of enabling
computerized retail checkout systems to process product discount coupons was rejected on the bases of obviousness and
failure of the specifications to support the claims. In affirming
the rejection of the application, the court of appeals indicated
that the collating and sorting capabilities of conventional
computers would make obvious the general application of
computer coordinate operations at several sites.
Patent Case Involving Circuit Design Projector Elicits Comment on Patent Litigation Procedure From
CAFC- The Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp.,
-F.2d(CAFC 1984).
The CAFC affirmed a decision in which Computervision
was held to infringe two of Perkin-Elmer's patents, patent
numbers 3,748,015 and 3,821,763, that related to Perkin-Elmer's "Micralign" circuit design projection printer. The
Micralign, which uses optics to trace a circuit design on a
silicon wafer, was the first commercially successful projection
printer for use in manufacturing semiconductor integrated circuits. The infringing printer sold by Computervision was
called the "Cobilt CA-3000."
In addressing some of the issues that arose regarding the
use of a jury at trial level, the court observed that: (1) it is
advisable in patent cases tried by juries to use the special verdict and interrogatory procedures under F.R.C.P. Rules 49(a)
and 49(b) respectively, and (2) contrary to the view expressed
by the Ninth Circuit in Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688
F.2d 647 (1982), a jury verdict on obviousness is binding and
not merely advisory, although directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict procedures are still available to
overcome the verdict at trial level.
After a finding of validity and infringement in Perkin-Elmer's favor by the Ninth Circuit, the case was remanded, and
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Computervision subsequently appealed to the CAFC. The
CAFC noted that the decision of the Ninth Circuit would be
accorded "great deference" under the law of the case doctrine.
Further, Computervision had not made a prima facie showing
of error by the Ninth Circuit sufficient to warrant CAFC review of the decision on its merits.
Computer Program Held Patentable Subject Matter-Method of Doing Business Challenge RejectedPaine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del.
1983).
United States patent number 4,346,442 ('442), owned by
Merrill Lynch, related to the data processing methodology (a
computer program) and apparatus for effecting Merrill
Lynch's Cash Management Account (CMA) service. CMA
combined three financial services commonly offered by
financial institutions and brokerage houses: (1) a brokerage
security account; (2) money market funds; and (3) a charge/
checking account. Paine Weber sought a declaratory judgment
that, inter alia, the patent was invalid because its claims "define[d] nothing more than the combination of familiar business systems," and that methods of doing business are not
within the categories of patentable subject matter listed in 34
U.S.C. section 101. Further, Paine Weber argued that even
though the patent claims were drafted in a "means plus function" format, the claims were, in fact, directed to a system
rather than to implementing apparatus. Essentially, Paine
Weber argued that a method of doing business or other matter not within section 101 cannot be elevated to patentable
subject matter by a general reference to implementing
apparatus.
The court held that it "need not determine ... whether
the '442 patent claim[ed] an apparatus or a process because
labels are not determinative in a section 101 analysis." As to
the fact that the '442 patent related to computer programming, the court stated that computer programs are patentable
if they satisfy the same requirements applicable to other types
of inventions.
As to Paine Weber's argument that the '442 patent was
directed to an unpatentable method of doing business, the
court declined to limit its focus on the fact that financial services were the end product of the CMA program. Instead, the
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court held that "the product of a computer is irrelevant, and
the focus of analysis should be on the operation of the program on the computer."
Computer-Related Patent Held Obvious- Medtronic,
Inc. v. CardiacPacemakers,Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Minn.
1983).
In holding patent number 3,833,005 on a remotely
programmable, digitally timed and controlled pacemaker invalid because of the obviousness of the patent's subject matter, the court noted, "Digital circuitry had been used primarily in computer science but its use in cardiac pacing devices
was being advocated and was slowly being adopted by the
mid-to-late 1960's."
Patent and Trademark Office Applies Supreme
Court's Diehr Decision in Upholding Patentability of
Program That Utilizes Mathematical Formula- Ex
Parte Widmer, (PTO Bd. of Apps. June 1982).
Although a code translator used for coding a textual message for transmission and encoding transmitted material to reconstruct the original message utilized mathematical formulae, the PTO Board of Appeals reversed a patent examiner's
determination that patent claims directed to the translator recited nonstatutory subject matter. The Board applied the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981), and found that "the mathematical formulae or algorithm which underlies the claimed subject matter is incidental to the main thrust of the invention . .. [which] is a
man-made concept ...
[that] never existed in nature." The

Board held that, because the claims related to a useful art and
did not simply claim a formula in the abstract, the claims
were directed to a patentable subject matter.
TAX
Renting of Computer Time Not Tax Exempt- Midwest
Research Institute v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D.
Mo. 1983).
Income derived by a tax-exempt scientific research corporation from renting time on its computer to outside companies
for use for their own purposes was determined by the court to
be taxable as income derived from activity unrelated to that
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which gave the corporation its general tax-exempt status.
Computer System Is Not Taxable Real PropertySecurity Data, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa, 145 Cal. App.
3d 108, 193 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1983).
After moving its computer system to a new facility, Security Data (Security) successfully sued the County of Contra
Costa and the City of Walnut Creek for refund of property
taxes that Security had paid on the system.
The determinative issue was whether the computer components were taxable real property fixtures or exempt personal property. The court found that none of the computer
components were taxable fixtures because: (1) the components
were installed in a general-purpose office building rather than
in a building built for a purpose involving the use of the computer system; (2) the use and location of the computer components in the building was not materially associated or essential to the purpose for which the building was constructed and
used; (3) the computer components were not intended to remain permanently in the building; (4) the computer components were on wheels and could be moved without significant
difficulty and without damaging or substantially disturbing
the computer room built to house them; (5) the components
had been, in fact, removed from the building without substantial difficulty, expense or consumption of time; and (6) the
components had not been destroyed when they were removed.
In answer to the argument advanced by the county and
city that the construction of a special computer room to house
the system made the system components fixtures by virtue of
the principles of "constructive annexation," the court held
that the features of the computer room were improvements
rather than fixtures, and that the governing principle was that
the nonattached items, the components, had to be significantly associated with the purpose for which the building is
used to be considered a fixture.
Court Recognizes Competition Between Electronic
and Printed Media in Tax Dispute- Moody's Investors
Service, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 112 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 445
N.E.2d 1331 (1983).
In holding that a variety of Moody's publications fell
within the exemption provided to newspapers from taxation
under Illinois' Retailer's Occupation Tax Act and Use Tax
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Act, the court was careful to avoid discrimination between
printed and electronic information communication, stating
that "it is a matter of common knowledge that brokerage offices today are linked to computers and other retrieval systems which furnish instant information of the type found in
Moody's publications." Taxation of the printed publications
would have thus made it more difficult for them to compete
with computerized and other data transmission systems.
License Agreements Viewed as Sales Transaction
and Taxed at Full Price, Not Just at Value of the
Tape- Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co.,
464 A.2d 248 (Md. 1983).
Auxton Computer Enterprises, Inc. (ACE) granted Equitable Trust Co. (Equitable) a nontransferable and nonexclusive right to use a program at a one-time price of $20,000
under an agreement that had no termination date. The court
held that the transaction involved tangible personal property,
namely, magnetic tapes which had been enhanced in value by
copies of the program coded thereon. The court held that the
"license agreement" was a taxable sales transaction. The court
also refused to sever the value of the "intangible knowledge or
information" that constituted the program from the mere
value of the medium of storage and transmission, the tape,
and held that tax would be assessed at the full price rendered
for the program.
Exemption of Computer Sale From Sales Tax Does
Not Prevent Imposition of Use Tax- Terco, Inc. v.
Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 339 N.W.2d 17 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983).
Terco, a Michigan computer leasing company, in a "casual and isolated transaction outside of its usual business activities," sold a computer to a Michigan corporate purchaser
for use inside Michigan. While the sale was exempt from sales
tax because it fell under th "isolated transaction" exception
from sales tax, the purchaser was subject to tax for its use of
the equipment in Michigan.
Data Processing Company Must Pay Sales Tax- Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Lindley, 3 Ohio St. 3d 22, 445
N.E.2d 1104 (1983).
Statistical Tabulating Corporation (STC), a data processing service company, unsuccessfully claimed that it was im-
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proper to assess a tangible items sales tax on its transactions.
STC provided payroll, accounts receivable and other business
data processing services to clients along with reports and
other documents, such as payroll checks.
The court found that the provision of written documents
by STC was not an inconsequential part of the services-tangible items package offered by STC and that the transactions
were therefore subject to sales tax. The court noted that in
analyzing data processing transactions, "if the company supplied the print-outs for the customer to use in making management decisions or other purposes, the print-outs are not
deemed inconsequential."
Use Tax Assessed Against Computer Tape
Purchase- Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 465 A.2d 1100
(Vt. 1983).
A bank that had purchased a computer software tape for
processing mortgage information unsuccessfully argued
against assessment of a state compensating use tax on the
purchase and use of the software. In holding that the use tax
must be paid, the court stated:
It may well be that the Bank could have procured, by way
of telephone or personal service, the same programming
information so as to avoid a use tax. To base the tax consequences of a transaction on how it could have been
structured "would require rejection of the established tax
principle that a transaction is to be given its tax effect in
accordance with what might have occurred." This we will
not do. The Bank must accept the consequences of its
choice to purchase the program in the form of a tape.
TORT
Product Liability Case Based on Computerized
Tool- Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 697 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1983).
A worker injured while working with computer-controlled
hydraulic tongs used on a drilling barge successfully sued,
among other defendants, the manufacturer of the equipment.
Because the plaintiff succeeded on a strict liability theory
based on defects in design and instructions, the court held
that comparative negligence could not be used to reduce
plaintiff's damage award.

1196

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

Computer Calculations of Dosage Figure in Medical
Products Liability Case- Jones v. Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Co., 669 P.2d 744 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
Products liability and breach of warranty action against
the manufacturer of radioactive implant seed used in treatment of prostate cancer discussed the use of a computer program to calculate the dosage.
Inability to Read Computer Screens Figures in Tort
Suit-. Christy v. Darr, 467 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983).
Tort victim's head trauma allegedly made it impossible
for him to read computer screens, thereby forcing him to
abandon his major in business administration in college. The
court took this into account in determining the victim's loss of
future earning capacity.
TRADEMARK
Active Video Game Market Leads Court to Construe
Trademark Categories Broadly- CBS, Inc. v. Morrow,
708 F.2d 1579 (1983).
The owner of the registered trademark, "Tinker Toys,"
for games, toys, and building blocks, opposed Morrow's application for registration of a stylized rendering of "Thinker
Toys" as a trademark for peripheral products for microcomputers, small computers, and/or data processing systems. Although Morrow did not sell video game products, the court
noted that the goods listed on the application were "identified
so broadly that they could include electronic components and
circuit boards for computer games and video games." Since
the registration for Tinker Toys also included games, the
court concluded that, "in view of the popularity of computer
and video games, applicant's electronic components and circuit boards, offered to the public under applicant's mark,
would likely to be perceived as source-related or somehow
connected with opposer." Thus, Morrow's application for registration was 'refused.
TRADE SECRET
Former Employees Enjoined from Use of Former Employer's Trade Secret or Confidential Information
and Engaging in Other Competitive Activity- Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. v. Digiserve,Inc., Civ. No. 253, 392
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(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1984) (tentative decision).
Mohawk Data Sciences (MDS), a manufacturer and seller
of data processing systems, including Qantel computers and
software, brought an action alleging, inter alia, trade secret
misappropriation and unfair competition against Digiserve,
Incorporated (DI), a company founded by former MDS employees that was MDS' only competitor in the market for servicing Qantel equipment.
The trade secret or confidential information at issue in
the case consisted of technical manuals, parts lists, field service bulletins, engineering change notices, and blueprints and
tapes containing computer programs for operational diagnosis.
Defendants' chief contention was that the material had lost
its proprietary character through disclosure to MDS customers and inadequate security precautions.
As to the argument that the information was disclosed to
an extent that made it public, the court stated:
California has adopted the Restatement view that absolute secrecy is not a requirement; rather the proprietor of
a trade secret may disclose it on a need to know or necessity basis to employees, customers and others if such disclosure is necessary for commercial exploitation of the information and adequate safeguards are established to
prevent further disclosure.
The court found that adequate precautions had been
taken by MDS in that MDS' blueprints, manuals and other
materials were stamped "confidential". In addition, all employees and franchisers were required to sign nondisclosure
agreements and were obligated to return all confidential documents, tools and equipment when their employment terminated. In answer to defendants' argument that MDS should
have used shredding and more stringent monitoring procedures to preserve confidentiality, the court stated, "[w]e have
not been furnished nor have we found any authority to the
effect that the proprietor of a trade secret must establish the
equivalent of a corporate CIA in order to enjoy the protection
of the law of trade secrets."
The court enjoined DI from: (1) disclosing or utilizing
MDS' confidential or trade secret information; (2) servicing
Qantel systems; (3) providing upgrade software for Qantel systems; and (4) attempting to induce MDS' employees to leave
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MDS' employ to work for DI.
Plaintiff Loses Trade Secret Action, But Defendant
Found In Contempt for Violation of InjunctionElectro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d
890 (Minn. 1983).
Electro-Craft Corporation (ECC), a manufacturer of servo
motors used for high technology applications such as computer disc drives and printers and industrial robots, brought a
trade secret action against Controlled Motion, Incorporated
(CMI), a corporation made up of former employees of ECC.
The court held that ECC failed to specify the trade
secrets allegedly misappropriated by CMI with respect to one
of the motor models involved. As to a second model, the court
held that ECC failed to take proper precautions to protect the
trade secret status of the allegedly misappropriated information. Although the court held that a previous injunction
against CMI was inappropriate, it also held that CMI's violation of the injunction provided grounds for a finding of civil
contempt.

